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Abstract
We estimate a structural model of a sponsored search auction model. To accommodate
the “position paradox”, we relax the assumption of decreasing click volumes with position
ranks, which is often assumed in the literature. Using data from “Website X”, one of the
largest online marketplaces in China, we find that merchants of different qualities adopt
different bidding strategies: high quality merchants bid more aggressively for informative
keywords, while low quality merchants are more likely to be sorted to the top positions for
vague keywords. Counterfactual evaluations show that the price trend becomes steeper
after moving to a score-weighted generalized second price auction, with much higher
prices obtained for the top position but lower prices for the other positions. Overall
there is only a very modest change in total revenue from introducing popularity scoring,
despite the intent in bid scoring to reward popular merchants with price discounts.
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1 Introduction
Presently, sponsored search is, by far, the most salient online advertising format. A report
from the Internet Advertising Bureau in 2013 shows that sponsored-search advertising is
now generating more than $18 billion per year, nearly half of the annual online advertising
spending in US. Due to its effectiveness and other benefits, sponsored advertising, which
was pioneered by search engines like Google and Bing, have now also been adopted on
many shopping platforms (akin to Amazon, eBay, etc.) to help merchants promote their
products. For example, when users type “Nike shoes” in Amazon’s search box, sponsored
ads are displayed at the bottom of the search result page, along with the “organic” results
(those generated by Amazon’s search algorithm).
Consumer behavior vis-a`-vis sponsored ads is likely to be quite different depending on
whether the ads are on a shopping platform, or on a page of general search results. Ads
on shopping platforms contain very specific information – including price, shipping pa-
rameters, delivery time, new or used condition, etc. – and allow consumers to selectively
click on those ads that meet their preferences. Users only need to click on links for options
they are seriously considering, which can garner substantial traffic even for ads at lower
positions. As such, this leads to a so-called “position paradox” (Jerath et al. (2011))
– an empirical finding that ads in higher positions may attract fewer clicks than ads in
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lower positions. On the other hand, with ads on search engines, which typically do not
contain price or specific product information, a “top-down” search – in which users click
firstly on the top ad and proceed downwards – is more likely. Such behavior leads to a
decreasing trend in click-through rates (CTR) across ad positions.
Auctions are the dominant mechanism whereby sponsored ad positions are sold on the
Internet, with competing merchants bidding for the available positions. Many existing
models of sponsored search auctions simplify the characterization of equilibrium bidding
by directly assuming that click-through rates for sponsored ads strictly decrease with ad
position.1 These studies have mainly focused on sponsored ad auctions run by search
engines, for which this assumption may be appropriate, as discussed above; however,
it may be unrealistic for sponsored search advertising on shopping platforms, which we
consider here.
In this paper, we propose a general structural model of sponsored search auctions.
We estimate the model using a unique dataset of sponsored search auctions at a large
Chinese shopping platform. Since our study company is a shopping platform, our model
specification is geared to accommodates the “position paradox”. Methodologically, we
develop a novel econometric setup which exploits the equivalence between the position
auctions and the classical assignment game of Shapley-Shubik (1972).
Our study website (anonymously dubbed “WebsiteX”) is one of the largest shopping
platforms in China, and one of the largest websites in the world by traffic. For a number
of years, the platform implemented a standard Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction
to determine ad positions and prices for each keyword. We focus on digital cameras,
which is a very popular product category on this platform.
Our estimation results show that merchants of different qualities adopt different bid-
ding strategies: high quality merchants bid more aggressively for informative keywords,
while low quality merchants are more likely to be sorted to the top positions for vague
keywords. One explanation is that, for digital camera-related keywords, informative
keywords (including specific camera model numbers) are likely to be queried by serious
buyers, and high quality merchants are more experienced and have learned that clicks
from these buyers are more likely to lead to sales. On the other hand, users who query
vague keywords (including brand names and promotional terms) may not be ready to
buy, and so experienced high quality merchants are less interested in these auctions.
Thus we find evidence of both horizontal and vertical differentiation in these auctions;
1Edelman et al. (2007); Varian (2007); Athey and Nekipelov (forthcoming). See Bo¨rgers et al. (2013)
for a general discussion of equilibria in these auctions without imposing these restrictions on preferences.
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auction outcomes can be non-assortative, in that higher quality merchants do not obtain
higher positions. Such results would not be consistent with the assumption of decreasing
click-through rates typically assumed in the literature (as discussed above).
To score or not to score? Using our estimates, we proceed to address an important
auction design question, as reflected in our paper’s title. After our sample period, our
study website revised the standard GSP by incorporating popularity scoring, a practice
originally developed by Google. In the score-based GSP auction, the ad position obtained
by a bidder will depend on her bid times a popularity/quality score, which typically
reflects the popularity of a bidder or her ads (as measured by past sales or click volumes).
By introducing scoring, our study website intended to reward “popular” merchants –
those whose previous ads generated many clicks, and sold many products in the past –
with price discounts. Introducing scoring to the GSP auction essentially penalizes smaller
and less prominent merchants and rewards larger merchants (i.e. a less popular bidder
pays a higher price than a more popular bidder for the same position, holding everything
else constant).2
Indeed, soon after our platform implemented such score-based GSP auction, a large
protest organized by small merchants broke out. They blamed the new scoring rule for
making them uncompetitive against big merchants. One small merchant, Longzhi521
complained that “small merchants on WebsiteX are unable to do business anymore, now
WebsiteX is just for the big merchants, its really unfair!” ILoveRainyDays lamented
that he ”recently quit my job to sell on WebsiteX fulltime, but after the change it is
impossible, as a small merchant, to get my ads noticed.” HangzhouWuMing, quoting
an ancient proverb, warns ominously that WebsiteX’s new rules which discourage small
merchants may have bad long-run consequences: “the waters (large merchants) which
carry the boat can also capsize it.”3
Our simulations show that the price trend becomes steeper under scoring, with much
higher prices obtained for the top position but lower prices for the other positions. This
suggests that while the intention of scoring was to reward popular merchants with price
discounts, these discounts were undone (in part) by more aggressive bidding by these
merchants. On the one hand, this confirms the fears of the small merchants quoted
above that they have to pay higher prices to get top positions. However, since CTRs in
2The use of bid scoring in sponsored search auctions has similar implications as bid preference policies
in procurement auctions (see McAfee and MacMillan (1989), or Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011).)
Generally, a scoring rule which favors stronger (high quality) contractors may lead to higher quality
work, while favoring weaker bidders enhances competition and lowers procurement costs.
3News release from sina.com.cn (date: Sept. 7, 2010)
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our model are not necessarily decreasing in ad position (and indeed are quite random),
the effect on the platform’s total revenue is ambiguous. Our simulations show that,
indeed, there is only a very modest change in total revenue from introducing popularity
scoring. Although other long term benefits from scoring – such as encouraging merchants
to improve ad quality, thus generating more clicks and enhancing the attractive of the
selling platform – are beyond the scope of our analysis, it is remarkable that even the
platform’s short term profits may not be much affected by rewarding popular merchants
with price discounts.
Existing literature. Although sponsored advertising auctions have received great
attention in the theoretical literature (beginning with Edelman et al. (2007) and Var-
ian (2007)), empirical research is still sparse. Bo¨rgers et al. (2013) utilize a revealed-
preference approach to test whether bids in Yahoo search auctions satisfied the Nash
Equilibrium inequalities for the sponsored search auction model. Yang et al. (2014)
studied how competition affects sponsored search advertisers’ bidding behavior, and they
modeled bids as equilibrium outcomes using the specification in Edelman et al. (2007).
Athey and Nekipelov (forthcoming) propose and estimate a structural model tailored to
specific features of sponsored search auctions run by US search engines (such as Google
or Microsoft). Specifically, they estimate a model characterized by score and entry un-
certainty (“SEU”), in which bidders face uncertainty when choosing their bids, due to
randomness in a bidder’s quality score over time, as well as in the set of competitors
bidding in the auction at any time.
Our paper is different from the aforementioned studies in several major ways. First,
during our sample period, our study website ran un-scored auctions, which eliminates
an important source of uncertainty in Athey and Nekipelov’s SEU model. Indeed, the
study website started scoring auctions only after our data sample, and the main ques-
tion addressed here is how this affected bidder allocations and platform revenue. Sec-
ond, we allow bidders to have preferences for positions which are not multiplicative
in bidder- and position-specific effects. This is in line with empirical evidence (Jeziorski
and Segal (forthcoming), Jeziorski and Moorthy (2014), Goldman and Rao (2014)) which
contradicts the multiplicative hypothesis. Finally, our dataset, compared to Athey and
Nekipelov’s dataset, contains substantial cross-sectional variation (a large number of key-
word queries), but no time series variation (but click volume and per-click prices averaged
over a one-month period). We model the aggregated outcomes as arising from a static
bidding model, thus abstracting away from changes in bidding behavior over the aggrega-
tion period. This is not an unreasonable approximation for WebsiteX’s auctions because,
during our sample period, all bids were submitted manually and, accordingly, participat-
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ing merchants revised their keyword choices and bids relatively infrequently4
Specifically, in this paper, we estimate a model of sponsored search auctions which is
closely related to the Shapley-Shubik assignment game.5 This connection to the Shapley-
Shubik model also ties our paper to the recent empirical literature using two-sided match-
ing models (e.g. Choo and Siow (2006), Fox (2013), Galichon and Salanie (2012), Gra-
ham (2011)). One important difference vis-a`-vis these papers, is that we explicitly model
and estimate the price formation process in the sponsored search auctions we study, while
these other papers focus on explaining the observed allocations.
In the following section we provide background information about the platform and
present the structural model for ad positions and prices from the generalized second price
auction. We derive the crucial link between the auction model and two-sided matching
models, which we exploit in estimation. In section 3, we derive the “Metropolis-Hastings
within Gibbs” Bayesian algorithm to estimate the structural parameters. In Sections 4
and 5, we describe the dataset and present the empirical findings. In section 6 we conduct
the counterfactual analysis to address the “to score or not to score” question. Section 7
concludes.
2 A Structural Model of Sponsored Search Auctions
2.1 Background: sponsored search auctions at “WebsiteX”
WebsiteX is one of the largest online marketplaces in China and, hence, one of the
most prominent websites in the world by traffic. Given the high costs and regulatory and
bureaucratic hurdles associated with opening brick-and-mortar businesses in China, many
small merchants market and sell their wares mainly using internet shopping platforms
like our study website. As a marketplace, WebsiteX has no direct American counterpart,
but shares features of both eBay and Craigslist. Unlike eBay, goods on WebsiteX are not
sold via auction, but rather by merchants posting prices for their products. WebsiteX
provides a platform whereby buyers can make secure money transactions to merchants.
Sponsored search results typically appear as “tiles” on the right-hand side and bottom
margins of each search page (see Figure 3 for an example).
4This differs from advertisers on search engines like Google or Yahoo, who use automated bidding
mechanism which make it easy to revise bids or keywords.
5As such, our work echoes Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) and Fox and Bajari’s (2013) study
of the FCC spectrum auctions, both of which apply an assignment game approach to multi-unit auctions.
Other non-auction settings in which the assignment game has been applied include marriage markets
(Becker (1973)), mergers (Akkus et al. (2013)), and hedonic pricing models (Chiappori et al. (2009)).
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Since WebsiteX is a marketplace, the content and role of its sponsored ads differ
substantially from the ads appearing on search engine result pages (like Google or Yahoo).
As Figure 3 shows, WebsiteX’s sponsored ads (as well as the non-sponsored “organic”
search results) typically contain a picture of the product, price, merchant name and
information, shipping details, and product specifications; in contrast, such details are
typically absent from Google’s sponsored search results, which contain only the URL
along with some brief slogans.
Since WebsiteX is a shopping platform, most of its users have a serious intent of pur-
chasing, and are using WebsiteX to find prices and product specifications to suit their
needs.6 Consequently, as we mentioned earlier, the top positions may not always receive
more clicks (and indeed, they do not, as we will show below). For this reason, the common
assumption in the existing sponsored search auction models (Edelman et al. (2007) and
Varian (2007), Athey and Nekipelov (forthcoming)) that the surplus matrix is supermod-
ular (being the product of a vector of bidder-specific constants and a nonincreasing vector
of position-specific click-through rates) seems inadequate for WebsiteX. Accordingly, in
our setup, we will allow the surplus to vary arbitrarily among merchants and across ad
positions, and also allow click volumes to be non-monotonic in ad position.
2.2 Generalized Second-Price Auction (GSPA)
Next we describe the generalized second-price auction framework. There are N available
positions and M ≥ N + 1 potential bidders (synonymously, merchants) for a generic
keyword auction. If bidder i obtains the j-th position, he obtains valuation (or surplus)
Vij, for all bidders i and positions j. In what follows, without loss of generality we will
index the positions from top to bottom by i = 1, . . . , N , and similarly we will also label
the N + 1 highest bidders by i = 1, . . . , N + 1.
The rules of the generalized second-price auction are as follows: for N positions, the
N -highest bidders will be winners, with the i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ N) highest bidder obtaining
position i at the per-click price equal to the i+ 1-th bidder’s bid. Using the terminology
in Varian (2007) and Bo¨rgers et al. (2013), we focus on the so-called “symmetric”
Nash equilibria in this complete-information bidding game.7 The equilibrium conditions
6It has been discussed for a while that many retailers fear becoming Amazon’s Showroom. This
phenomena is even more radical in China as running a retail store would incur more tax and fee liability.
By contrast, running a online store can sidestep these hidden costs. Consequently, the price gap between
online and retail stores in China is even larger than the USA counterpart.
7These are closely-related to the “locally envy-free” equilibria in Edelman et al. (2007). These
equilibria are convenient to analyze, and easy to compute via linear programming; as noted in Bo¨rgers
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satisfied by a bid vector (b1, . . . , bM) for M ≥ N + 1 are
Vii − αibi+1 ≥ Vij − αjbj+1, ∀i, j (1)
where αj denotes the click volume for position j. This inequality ensures that, at the
equilibrium, the bidder who obtains positions i (who obtains valuation Vii and makes a
payment equal to the click volume αi times bi+1, the per-click price submitted by the
bidder in position i + 1), does not wish to deviate to position j, for which the surplus
would be equal to the RHS of the inequality.8 Making the substitution pi = bi+1 (that
is, the per-click price for the i-th position equals the bid in the i + 1-th position), we
have
Vii − αipi ≥ Vij − αjpj, ∀i, j. (2)
2.3 GSPA as Two-sided Matching
Our estimation approach relies critically on the reinterpretation of the GSPA as an as-
signment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). To draw this connection, we consider a
“matching” problem where bidders are matched to positions. We denote by
ui ≡ Vii − αipi (3)
the equilibrium payoff of bidder i, and
tj ≡ αjpj (4)
the equilibrium payoff for the platform from the j-th position. Now rewriting the equi-
librium inequalities (2) above, we get
ui + tj ≥ Vij
with equality (by construction) iff i = j. These are the well-known “no-blocking” condi-
tions from the matching problem with transfers (cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990; chap.
8)). To see why, consider a bidder i and position j, and assume that ui + tj < Vij or,
equivalently, ui < Vij − tj. In this case, since bidder i’s payoff ui is lower than the net
et al. (2013), no such characterization is available for the asymmetric Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, it
is possible to adapt our estimator to the case of asymmetric Nash equilibria; we leave the details for
future research.
8In contrast, in asymmetric Nash equilibria, Eq. (1) holds only for j > i, but is Vii−αibi+1 ≥ Vij−αibj
for j < i. This recognizes an asymmetry that in order to switch to a lower position, bidder i only needs
to beat the price of that position, but to switch to a higher position, bidder i must beat the bid of the
winner of that position.
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surplus that she would obtain from deviating to position j (=Vij − tj), she would not
agree to the given allocation, and the equilibrium would break down; since the pair of
bidder i and position j would “block” the proposed allocation, the payoffs (ui, tj) cannot
support this allocation in equilibrium.
Moreover, introducing the binary indicators µ(i, j) = 1 if bidder i obtains position j,
and zero otherwise,9 and summing up across all bidders and positions using Eqs. (3,4),
we have ∑
i,j
ui + tj =
∑
i,j
[µ(i, j)Vij − αipi + αipi] =
∑
i,j
µ(i, j)Vij. (5)
This “feasibility” condition is the link between the sponsored-search auction model and
the assignment game, as it is implied by the duality theorem of linear programming for
that latter model. In the remainder of this section, we flesh out this connection.
2.4 Optimal allocation in GSPA: matching Positions to Bid-
ders
If bidder i obtains the j-th position, the valuation function is given by
Vij = δ(Xi, Z
j; β) + ij (4)
where Xi is the vector of bidder i’s characteristics and Z
j is the j-th position-specific char-
acteristics. The δ(·) is the deterministic component of the valuation function parametrized
by a finite dimensional parameter β, and ij is the unobservable match-and-auction-
specific valuation.10 We will refer to V the valuation matrix, where the (i, j) entry
of V is Vij. We further assume the unobserved valuation shocks satisfy the following
assumption
Assumption 1. ij is a continuous random variable with mean zero and variance σ
2 <∞
with unbounded support on R. ij is mutually independent across index i, j.
An allocation (or matching) µ, is a binary matrix indicating which bidder acquires
which position. We use 1 to indicate the assignment of positions to bidders, and zero
otherwise. For example, if bidder 1 gets the second position, and bidder 2 gets the first
position, the allocation µ is
9Using our indexing convention that bidder i is allocated position i, we have µ(i, j) = 1 for i = j,
and zero otherwise.
10This is a complete information game in which ij is assumed to be observable to all players within
the game but unobservable to the researchers.
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1 2
bidder1 0 1
bidder2 1 0
In the one-to-one assignment game, the row sum and column sum are equal to 1. We
will write µ(i, j) as the (i, j) entry of µ. In a N -by-N assignment game, there are N !
allocations. We will refer to Ω as the set of all possible allocations and µω as an generic
element of Ω, where ω = 1, 2, . . . , N !. The total surplus under allocation µω is denoted
by Sµω(V)
Sµω(V) =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
[
δ(Xi, Z
j; β) + ij
]
· µω(i, j) ≡ ∆µω + Ξµω , where
∆µω =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 δ(Xi, Z
j; β) · µω(i, j) and
Ξµω =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 ij · µω(i, j)
Based on V, the total surplus S(V) for each allocation µω ∈ Ω can be calculated.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) consider the assignment problem of finding the optimal one-
to-one allocation that maximizes the total (social) surplus, as well as the stable price
systems to support/decentralize the optimal allocation. The social planner’s problem,
can be formulated as the following linear program (which we denote (P)):
maxµ(i,j)
∑
i,j Vijµ(i, j)
s.t.
∑
i µ(i, j) = 1,∀i∑
j µ(i, j) = 1,∀j
µ(i, j) ∈ {0, 1},∀(i, j)
(P)
Since there are only finitely many allocations in Ω, a solution always exists in such
maximization problem (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).11
Lemma 1. Under assumption 1, the optimal allocation (the solution to (P))is unique
almost surely.
11This result contrasts with two-sided matching models without transfers, in which the multiplicity of
stable allocations becomes a major concern; e.g., Boyd et al. (2006), Logan et al. (2008), Menzel (2011),
Hsieh (2011), and Echenique, et al. (2013), among others.
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Proof. Take any two allocations µl 6= µq, (µl, µq) ∈ Ω. The event {Sµl(V) = Sµq(V)} =
{Ξµl − Ξµq = ∆µq − ∆µl} is a set of measure zero under assumption 1. It immediately
follows that the ordering of {Sµω(V)}ω=1,...,N ! is strict almost surely.
2.5 Equilibrium prices in the GSPA
The linear program (P) yields the optimal allocation of assigning positions to bidders.
Since our goal is to analyze not only allocations, but also prices, we will turn to the
dual linear program, which yields the prices supporting the optimal allocation in equi-
librium.
Recall that we denote by ui the equilibrium payoff of bidder i, and tj(≡ αjpj) the
equilibrium payoff of the j-th position. By the duality theorem of linear programming,
the dual problem of (P) is given by
min
∑N
i=1 ui +
∑N
j=1 tj
s.t. ui ≥ 0, tj ≥ 0,∀i, j
ui + tj ≥ Vij,∀i, j
(DP)
The first set of constraints, ui ≥ 0, tj ≥ 0, are individual rationality condition: both
bidders and search engine should have non-negative profit. The second set of constraints,
corresponds to the incentive compatibility, or no-blocking pair conditions. The set of
(ui, tj) that solves (DP) is denoted the set of stable matchings (see Roth and Sotomayor,
1990). Shapley and Shubik (1972) further show that ui+tj = Vij iff µij = 1. By summing
this across (i, j), we obtain Eq. (5) above, which provides the link between the GSPA
and the assignment game, as we alluded to before.
In general, it is well-known that there exist multiple transfers t = (t1, . . . , tN) that
solve (DP), and there exist bidder-optimal t and platform-optimal t¯.12 This multiplicity
in equilibrium prices raises issues for estimation, as we will discuss below. By contrast,
given Lemma 1, the corresponding optimal matching µ that solves (P) is unique almost
surely.
12The literature on multi-item auction raises a design problem of how specific auction mechanism
may select particular stable matchings. For example, Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) propose an
auction mechanism in which the bidder-optimal stable matching is the equilibrium outcome.
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Within the set of stable matchings t, the generalized second-price auction mechanism
selects a subset in which the transfers are monotonically decreasing in ad position:
{t|t solves (DP) & p1 > p2 > . . . pN ; ti = αipi}. (6)
We will refer to this as the set of “stable per-click prices.”
Example: (Non-)existence of equilibrium in GSPA. While Shapley and Shubik
(1972) proved that the set of stable matchings is always nonempty for arbitrary Vij, this is
no longer true once the additional monotonicity condition (6) is imposed. Hence, without
extra assumptions on Vij or the click volumes, the generalized second-price mechanism
may not necessarily guarantee the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium (or equiv-
alently, competitive price system). Consider an example: the valuation matrix is given
by
1 2
bidder1 3 4
bidder2 1 3
and α1 = α2 = 1. The set of stable prices for the Shapley-Shubik assignment game is
shaded in blue in Figure 4. We see that this region lies completely above the 45-degree
line, where p2 > p1 (the price for the second position exceeds that of the top position);
the GSPA, on the other hand, requires p1 > p2. The problem in this example is that both
players value the second position more than the first one, making it impossible to sell
the first position with a higher market price. In our empirical model, our assumptions
on valuations (Assumption 1) allow cases similar to this example to arise with positive
probability. For estimation, we wish to restrict attention only to the set of Vij that
are consistent with equilibrium in the GSPA, which introduces a complicated trunca-
tion problem (similar to that arising in Hong and Shum’s (2003) econometric study of
asymmetric ascending auctions). 
3 Data
We obtained a one-month (in 2010) sponsored-link auction dataset from WebsiteX, which
is the largest online marketplace in China. The dataset includes aggregate information
on 487 keywords of digital camera/camcorder and related accessories. The number of ad
positions ranges from 5 to 9. According to insiders at WebsiteX, merchants there usually
review their keyword lists and make purchase decisions infrequently. As a result, the
actual auction environment is not as complicated as Google or Yahoo!, in which bidders
often apply some automatic bidding algorithm to dynamically manage their positions
11
and per-click prices. During the study period, WebsiteX applies standard GSPA without
score weighting. The bidding environment of WebsiteX is therefore more closely related
to the static model described in Edelman et al. (2007) and Varian (2007).
For each keyword string, we observe several sets of variables. First, for each winning
bidder (merchant), we observe their average (over one-month) per-click price, along with
with the aggregate click volume over this month. We fit these data into our static auction
framework by sorting the bidders by their average per-click price, and then placing the
bidder paying the highest average price in the the top position, the bidder paying the
second highest price in the second position, etc. Second, we observe very little about
individual merchants except “quality ratings” which WebsiteX creates (using their pro-
prietary algorithm) based on buyer feedback and merchants’ sales volumes. Specifically,
each bidder is rated on an increasing quality scale from 1 to 20, which is also broken into
quality brackets: top (16-20), high (11-15), medium (6-10) and low (1-5). In our dataset,
there are no top merchants, so in our analysis we will distinguish between three quality
types: low, medium, and high. Third, we construct dummy variables to describe charac-
teristics of each keyword string: 1. Brand, whether the keyword includes a brand name
such as Nikon or Canon; 2. Specific, whether the keyword includes a specific model/series
number, such as D300s or 500D; 3. Promotional, whether the keyword includes promo-
tional terms such as “cheap” or “sale”. Summary statistics for these variables are given
in Table 1.
A first look at the data. We begin with some reduced form statistics and tabula-
tions from the data to motivate details of our model specification. From the perspective
of search engines it is important to know how advertisers’ bidding strategies are related
to their quality rankings and keyword characteristics. Do certain types of bidders bid
more aggressively for certain type of keywords? What is the sorting pattern between
quality and rank? Table 2 contains a contingency table summarizing bidders’ quality
versus the ad positions they obtained. Overall, the evidence for assortative matching in
bidder quality across ad positions is mixed. On the one hand, from the top panel of the
table, we see that about one-third of the high-quality bidders (=7.2% of total bidders)
get the top ad position in the auctions in which they won a position, and this percentage
falls across positions. However, for medium quality bidders, we see that most of them are
sorted to position 5 (16.1%) followed by 3 (15.6%). The results are qualitatively stable
after doing the analysis separately for different types of keyword queries, as is shown in
the remaining panels in Table 2.
Although it seems that the allocation patterns do not vary with keyword characteris-
tics, the per-click prices and click volumes do move dramatically. The boxplot of log click
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volumes13 and per-click prices are depicted in Figure (1) and (2) respectively. In Figure
(1) we compare the boxplot of log click volumes across the top 5 positions, conditional on
different dummies. First, clearly the assumption of decreasing click volume with rank is
violated since the middle of the boxplot does not decrease when rank decreases. In fact,
only 5 out of 487 keywords have strictly decreasing click volumes. Second, we observe
that keyword characteristics shift the click volume distributions. Keywords containing
specific model number usually receive more click volumes across all ranks of position
(top-left of Figure 1). Keywords containing brand name slightly decrease the click vol-
umes (top-right of Figure 1). It is also interesting to note that keywords containing
promotional terms in fact generate smaller click volumes (bottom-left of Figure 1).
Lastly, we turn our attention to the distribution of per-click prices (Figure 2). We find
that per-click prices are generally higher (and have more extreme outliers) for keywords
containing specific model number (top-left of Figure 2). Adding brand name on average
does not change per-click price, but it does create more outliers (top-right of Figure 2).
Adding promotional terms does not change per-click price (bottom-left of Figure 2).
4 Estimation
Next we consider the estimation of the sponsored search auction using data on the ob-
served allocation as well as the per-click prices. We use a Bayesian approach to estimate
this model. There are a large number of latent variables in this model, relative to the ob-
served variables: in each auction, for the N -dimensional vector of observed bids, there are
N2 corresponding unobservabled: namely, the full set of valuations {Vij}i,j=1...N that each
merchant has for each position. An important virtue of the Bayesian approach is the use
of “data augmentation” (Tanner and Wong (1987)), whereby these latent variables are
treated as unknown parameters, and jointly inferred in the estimation procedure.14
However, the multiplicity of stable per-click prices, mentioned earlier, raises difficul-
ties with a Bayesian estimation approach, as it leads to indeterminacy of the likelihood
function for the prices. In this paper, we complete the model by assuming particular
parametric equilibrium selection rules, as we describe below.15
13As there are some keywords that receive extremely large amount of click volumes, for graphical
presentation purpose we depict the boxplots in the log scale.
14In contrast, in a frequentist framework, these latent valuations must be integrated out of the esti-
mating equations; this is difficult using typical numerical integration methods (quadrature, simulation)
due to the large dimensionality of the integration.
15In Appendix B, we consider an alternative approach, using bounds based upon the struture of the
equilibrium price set, which is agnostic as to the equilibrium selection rule. Such an approach turns out
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4.1 The likelihood of auction allocations and prices
The central component of our Bayesian estimation procedure is the derivation of the joint
likelihood function for the auction outcomes (the matching of bidders to positions and
the corresponding prices). This is the focus of this section.
As the set of bidders and the number of positions vary from auction to auction,
defining the random vector p and random matrix µ requires additional care to avoid
a labeling problem. Following the previous section we will sort the element of p, pi,
in decreasing order, and therefore Xi corresponds to the bidder who pay pi. Under
this indexing system, the allocation µ will be the identity matrix. Suppose the econo-
metrician observes T independent keyword auctions indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In
each keyword auction t one observes two sets of dependent variables, the allocation
µt and the vector of per-click prices pt = (p1t, . . . , pNtt). The exogenous variables are
Xt = (X1t, . . . , XNtt),Zt = (Z
1t, . . . , ZNtt), αt = (α1t, . . . , αNtt). Let V denote the collec-
tion of latent valuation matrices for all keyword auctions (V1,V2, . . . ,VT ), and similarly
we define µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µT ), p = (p1,p2, . . . ,pT ) and (X,Z, α). The posterior is given
by
f(θ,V|µ,p,X,Z, α) ∝ L(µ,p|θ,V; X,Z, α)p0(θ,V|X,Z)
The specification of the priors is given in the Appendix. Here we focus on the form
of the likelihood, given by
L(µ,p|θ,V; X,Z, α) = ΠTt=1L(µt,pt|θ,Vt; Xt,Zt, αt). (7)
Importantly, the likelihood above differs from the likelihood which would be optimized
in a frequentist setting (ie. MLE), because the unobserved valuations V are treated as
conditioning variables. This is due to “data augmentation”, as discussed above. In the
frequentist likelihood, in contrast, V cannot be conditioned on (since it is unobserved),
and would need to be integrated out.16 The likelihood (7) can be further decomposed
into
L(µt,pt|θ,Vt; Xt,Zt, αt) = L1(pt|µt, θ,Vt; Xt,Zt, αt)L2(µt|θ,Vt; Xt,Zt) (7)
the two terms of which are the conditional likelihoods of per-click prices (given the
allocation and valuations), and the allocation (given valuations). The explicit forms
to be quite computationally challenging, compared to the approach we use in this paper.
16Specifically, the frequentist likelihood is L(µ,p|θ,V;X,Z, α) =∫ · · · ∫ L(µ,p|θ,V;X,Z, α)dG(V|X,Z) which is difficult to evaluate due to the large dimension-
ality of V.
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of L1 and L2 are derived from, respectively, the dual and primal LP problems for the
assignment game. We consider each component in turn.
The component L1. For expositional simplicity we will drop the auction index t
for now. Conditional on µ, the set of stable per-click prices is a convex polyhedron de-
fined by a set of linear inequalities derived from the dual LP problem of the assignment
game, which comprise (i) the “no-blocking pair” inequalities (Eq. (1)); (ii) the individual
rationality constraints, that Vii − ti ≥ 0; and (iii) the monotonicity and non-negativity
conditions on per-click prices: p1 > p2 > . . . > pN ≥ 0. The details of these linear
inequalities are given in the appendix; we let P(V, α) denote the polyhedron of equilib-
rium per-click prices in the sponsored-search auction, given a set of bidder valuations and
position-specific click volumes (V, α). As P depends on the realization of unobserved ij,
the set of stable per-click prices itself is a random closed convex polyhedron.
Correspondingly, the conditional likelihood for the per-click prices is a distribution
supported on a convex polyhedron: L1(pt|µt, θ,Vt; Xt,Zt, αt) = L1(pt|µt,P(Vt, αt), λ),
where λ, a probability measure over P, denotes an equilibrium selection rule whereby
pt is selected from P(Vt, αt). To proceed, we consider parametric equilibrium selection
rules to complete the likelihood specification, following Bajari et al. (2010).17 Specifying
such a distribution in our case is nontrivial, as the support P(V, α) depends on the latent
variables. We consider two parsimonious specifications. First, we assume that all prices
satisfying the no-blocking conditions are drawn with uniform probability, which is equal
to the reciprocal of the volume of the polyhedron of values of prices which satisfy the
linear inequalities {p : A(αt)p ≤ b(Vt)}:
L1(pt|µt,P(Vt, αt), λ) = 1(A(αt)pt ≤ b(Vt)) 1
vol(P(Vt, αt))
In what follows we will call this the “Uniform” specification of equilibrium selection.
Second, we assume that each component of pt, pit, is independently draw from beta
distribution defined on [p
it
, p¯it] truncated to A(αt)pt ≤ b(Vt), where ΠNti=1[pit, p¯it] is the
smallest bounding box of P(Vt, αt):
17In the existing literature, another common approach for dealing with multiple equilibria is to identify
and compute bounds on the structural parameters of the model, thus avoiding the explicit specification
of the equilibrium selection rule λ; e.g., Ciliberto and Tamer (2009); Beresteanu et al. (2011); Galichon
and Henry (2011) among others. Applying this approach in our context is briefly discussed in Appendix
B.
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L1(pt|µt,P(Vt, αt), λ) ∝ 1(A(αt)pt ≤ b(Vt))ΠNti=1
{(pit − pit)a−1(p¯it − pit)b−1
B(a, b)(p¯it − pit)a+b−1
}
,
where B(a, b) is the Beta function. Under this specification (which we will denote the
“Beta” specification), the shape parameters (a, b) in the beta distribution will be addi-
tional parameters to be estimated.
The component L2. Conditional on Vt, the likelihood L2 is binary (0-1) val-
ued:
L2(µt|θ,Vt; Xt,Zt) = L2(µt|Vt) =
{
1 if Vt rationalizes µt
0 otherwise
Moreover, at the observed (pt, µt), all Vt which lead to a nonzero value for L1 automat-
ically rationalize µt, and lead to a nonzero value of L2. As a result, L2 is redundant and
we can simplify
L(µt,pt|θ,Vt; Xt,Zt, αt) ∝ L1(pt|µt, θ,Vt; Xt,Zt, αt).
4.2 Estimation algorithm
We estimate the structural parameters via a Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs sampler
(Robert and Casella (2005)). We summarize the procedure here, but give complete details
in the appendix. The “outer loop” is a Gibbs sampler which loops sequentially over
three conditional densities: the conditional density of θ, the conditional density related
to equilibrium selection of multiple equilibrium prices, and the conditional density of the
latent valuations Vij (the augmented component). Since these are difficult to sample from
directly, within each Giibs step we use a Metropolis-Hastings approach to obtain draws
from these three conditional densities. The main idea closely follows that of Albert and
Chib (1994), and Logan et al. (2008).18
4.3 Specification details
We end this section with some details of our model specification. First, in our model we
allow the click volumes (the α’s) to vary non-monotonically across positions, in line with
the evidence presented earlier in Figure (1). However, in our data, there are instances
when the top position may receive zero clicks (cf. Table 1), but still attract bidders.
18Logan et al estimate a two-sided matching game without transfers. Their Gibbs sampler does not
take into account multiple equilibria, and hence cannot be directly applied here.
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Such an occurence would not be explicable in our model unless we allow for bidders to be
uncertain about the click volume at the time they are submitting their bids, and hence
bid based on expectations about the click volume (so that the realized click volume may
not coincide with the ex ante expectation).19 Hence, we allow for this by assuming that
bidders’ beliefs about αjt, the click volume of the j-th position at auction t, satisfies the
following shifted log-normal process (and are independent of their valuations Vij):
log(αjt + 1) = γj0 + γj1Nt + γj2specifict + γj3promotionalt + γj4brandt + ηjt,
where Nt is the number of available positions and ηit follows N (0, σ2).20 The unknown
parameters can then be estimated by OLS, and the expected click volume is given by
E[αjt] = exp(γj0 + γj1Nt + γj2specifict + γj3promotionalt + γj4brandedt + σ
2
j/2)− 1.
We use the estimated E[αjt] instead of αjt in our estimation procedure.
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Second, for bidders’ valuations Vij we consider two specifications which contain inter-
actions of bidder-specific and position-specific variables:
Model I
Vijt = β0 + β1specifict
+β2promotionalt + β3brandt
+β4highi
1
j
+β5mediumi
1
j
+β6highi
1
j
× specifict +β7mediumi 1j × specifict
+β8highi
1
j
× promotionalt +β9mediumi 1j × promotionalt
+β10highi
1
j
× brandedt +β11mediumi 1j × brandt + σijt
(11)
where ijt is an i.i.d. standard normal random sequence. In this specification, we impose
a hyperbolic decay (1/j) in coefficients across positions. Note that while this specification
imposes monotonicity in the coefficients across positions, the trend is allowed to be either
decreasing or increasing (depending on the sign of the β’s).
19Indeed, without this, zero click volume for a position would imply zero transfer for the top position,
which would unreasonably imply zero transfer for all positions in the model.
20A similar specification is used in Yang et al. (2014), but here we do not impose that αi decays from
high to low positions.
21Even after regression smoothing, E[αjt] is still nondecreasing in j in some cases. An important
restriction of the assignment game framework is that we cannot allow the (expected) click volume to be
bidder-specific. We will return to this point when discussing the counterfactual simulations below.
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Model II
Vijt = β0 + β1specifict
+β2promotionalt + β3brandt
+β1jhighi +β2jmediumi
+β3jhighi × specifict +β4jmediumi × specifict
+β5jhighi × promotionalt +β6jmediumi × promotionalt
+β7jhighi × brandt +β8jmediumi × brandt + σijt
if j ≤ 5 and = σijt if j > 5
(12)
This is a more flexible specification which allows each of the β coefficients to be position
specific, and no longer imposes a monotonic trend as in Model I. (For tractability, we as-
sume these coefficients to be zero for positions lower than 5, as click volumes and per-click
prices for such lower positions are generally so small that they can be ignored.)22
Comparison: model specification in existing papers. Our specification de-
tails here contrast with those in Varian (2007), Edelman et al. (2007), and Athey and
Nekipelov (forthcoming), who consider a multiplicative specification of bidder’s valua-
tions:
Vij = viαj. (5)
In tandem with the assumption that click volumes decrease in ad position (α1 > α2 · · · >
αN), this multiplicative specification (5) implies that every bidder has exactly the same
preference ordering over positions: everyone prefers a higher position. Subsequently, it
is easy to show that the optimal allocation is perfectly assortative matching: the k-th
position is assigned to the bidder having the k-th highest valuation. In contrast, our
specifications of valuations and click volume described earlier allow us to accommodate
the richer patterns in allocations and click volumes which were evidenced in the data.

5 Estimation Results
Table (3) contains the results of the Model I specification. Since the results are similar
using both the uniform and beta equilibrium selection rules, we will focus on the uniform
rule (results in third column of Table 3) in the discussion. We find evidence for positive
assortative matching between bidders’ quality and ad positions. The posterior mean of
coefficients of high and medium quality dummies are all positive (688.96 and 479.75,
22See the appendix for a discussion of parameter identification for these specifications of preferences.
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respectively), and distinct from zero (larger than 3 times the standard deviation). Fur-
thermore, the magnitude of the coefficient of high quality is larger than that of medium,
implying that the top quality bidders have the highest valuations, all else equal.
However, there is substantial heterogeneity. We see that this positive assortative
matching pattern is further amplified in auctions containing product-specific keywords
(the interactions with “specific” are 539.45 and 516.41 for high and medium bidders,
respectively). Since the positive assortative matching is extremely strong in product-
specific keyword auctions, it is less likely that low quality bidder would win top positions
here. In contrast, the interactions with “brand” are strongly negative (-341.05 for high-
quality bidders, -395.04 for medium quality), and offset the positive coefficients described
earlier. This finding suggests that high quality online (camera) merchants have a rela-
tively low assessment of keyword strings containing brand names, so that lower quality
merchants stand a higher chance of winning such auctions. (The interactions are likewise
negative for the promotional keywords, but not as large in magnitude.)
These results imply horizontal differentiation across different types of keywords, as
high quality merchants have relatively higher valuations for keywords including specific
model names, and relatively lower valuations for other types of keywords. This differ-
ence may be explained by heterogeneity in the consumers who use the different keyword
queries. For cameras, keyword queries with model-specific keywords result in the most
narrow range of search results. Major camera manufacturers usually use unique model
numbers to distinguish their products from others. For example, Nikon’s DSLR (digital
single-lens reflexive) camera models typically start with a “D” followed by numbers; e.g.,
D3, D90, D300s, etc. Similarly, Canon models typically begin with numbers followed by
“D”; e.g., 550D and 5D.23 Hence, shoppers querying with model-specific keywords are
probably well-informed consumers who have a clear idea which specific products they are
interested in, and are searching with a strong intention of purchasing. Our results indi-
cate, then, that high quality online merchants, who are typically also more experienced,
gravitate towards more narrowly defined keyword queries which are likely to be made by
serious buyers.
In contrast, shoppers who use brand names to search may be more interested in brows-
ing and collecting information about different camera models; searching for, say, “Nikon”
will return a wide variety of models and accessories across many price points. These con-
sumers may have a more muted intention of purchasing, and our results imply that high
quality online merchants – again, those who are more experienced – have correspond-
23Fujifilm uses the combination of “X” and numbers, Sony uses “A” and numbers, Pentax use “K”
and numbers, and Olympus usually starts with “E”.
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ingly lower assessments of these keywords. Finally, the design of WebsiteX ads partially
neutralizes the effect of additional promotional terms. Most of the sponsored links di-
rectly contain price information (Figure 3), making it extremely easy for consumers to
compare different prices on the internet. Hence, their purchase probabilities are unlikely
to be swayed by purely marketing terms such as “big sale”, rendering these promotional
keywords of little value to the more-experienced high-quality merchants.
Table (4) and (5) summarize the estimation results of model II. Again, we focus on
the results for the uniform equilibrium selection rule (in Table 4). The main differences
between the Model I and Model II specifications is that the latter allows the parameters
in bidder’s valuations to be completely flexible vis-a-vis position rank. But even after
allowing this flexibility, we find qualitatively similar patterns in valuations compared with
the more restrictive model I results. As before, we find that high-quality bidders have
relatively higher valuations for top positions in keyword queries involving product-specific
keywords, but they have relatively lower valuations for top positions in queries involving
promotional of brand-specific keywords. Thus our finding of horizontal differentiation in
preferences appears robust to different specifications of bidders’ valuations.
Quantitatively, the more flexible Model II specification does yield some additional
findings. In some cases, it is the second position that generates the largest value for high
quality merchants, not the first position; for specific keywords, as an example, high quality
merchants value position 2 most highly: the coefficient for position 2 is 203.12=230.99-
27.87, while for position 1 it is only 112.22=16.39+95.83. Similarly, medium-quality
merchants also value the second position most highly in specific keyword queries. This
phenomena may be related to the empirical fact we found in the click volume data, that
often it is the second position that generates the largest click volume, even after the
regression smoothing. From the merchants’ perspective, the second position is almost
as good as the first slot, because the click volume is comparable with the top but the
per-click price is lower.
However, when the valuation matrix is not positively assortative, which is the case
in our results, then it is unclear whether the GSP mechanism is socially optimal. As
pointed out by Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011), the sponsored-link
auction also plays the role of information intermediary. If the links are sorted according
to merchants’ quality, then it allows the consumer to efficiently search for merchants who
fit their quality needs. If the valuation matrix is positively assortative between quality
and ranking, then high quality merchants will bid aggressively and hence GSP is an
efficient way to convey information to online shoppers.
On the other hand, as we noted before, WebsiteX merchants typically post their
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prices on the sponsored ads, thus providing consumers with the most important piece of
purchase-related information without requiring further clicking behavior. In this setting,
consumer search may be less relevant and, hence, the click volume in WebsiteX is less
regular than described in the literature motivated from Yaoo!, Google and Microsoft;
e.g., Varian (2006), Athey and Nekipelov (forthcoming).24
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the Beta distribution parameters a and b are
positive, with a >> b, for both the Model I and model II estimates (bottom of tables
3 and 5). This implies that the equilibrium selection density function is left-skewed, so
that higher prices are much more likely to be chosen. This suggests that the observed
prices are better explained as optimal for WebsiteX, rather than for the merchants.
6 Counterfactual: The Effects of Bid Scoring
Using our estimation results, we now turn to the main policy question of this paper, which
is assessing the effects of the bid-scoring policy which WebsiteX enacted only shortly after
our sample period. This bid scoring was implemented using a score-weighted version of
the GSPA (which we will call WGSPA hereinafter); that is, the positions are allocated by
ranking the product of each bid times a “popularity score” for this bidder. Specifically,
letting κi, i = 1, . . . , N denote the bidder-specific popularity scores, the positions are
assigned according to the weighted bids: κ1b1 > κ2b2 > · · · > κNbN . Furthermore, the
bidder winning position i pays a per-click price pii such that bidder i’s score κipii is
exactly equal to the score of the bidder in the i+ 1-th position:
κipii = κi+1bi+1 or pii =
κi+1
κi
bi+1. (13)
The total payment of a bidder in the i-th position is αipii. This mechanism essentially
rewards the high quality advertisers with price discounts (if κi > κi+1, then pii < bi+1,
while pii = bi+1 under the unscored GSPA rule); at the same time, this also incentivizes
online merchants to improve their quality. Intuitively, offering price discounts may reduce
the platform’s revenue.25 We show, however, it is possible that the per-click price can be
even higher under WGSPA.
Importantly, in the WGSPA, the implicit “price” that the bidder in position i must pay
to obtain position j differs from bidder to bidder (depending on their score κi), and hence
24While it is difficult to collect price data from WebsiteX, we collected a limited sample of screen
captures and found no noticeably trends in product prices across ad positions.
25Indeed, Myerson’s (1981) classic work suggests that, for standard auctions, a platform may be able
to raise expected revenues by discriminating against high-valuation bidders.
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the resulting game cannot be formulated as an assignment game a` la Shapley-Shubik (in
which agents are essentially price-takers). Suppose a generic bidder is indexed by i, and
a generic position and the bid paid for that position is indexed by j. An allocation µ is a
one-to-one function that maps each bidder’s index to the corresponding position index.
µ(i) = j means that bidder i is assigned to the j-th position, and the inverse mapping,
µ−1(j) = i, would identify who is assigned to the j-th position.
Since the WGSPA cannot be formulated as an assignment game, the equilibrium
allocation may not be unique. An allocation and a sequence of bids (µ; b1, . . . , bN , bN+1)
constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium if the following inequalities are satisfied26:
1. κµ−1(1)b1 > κµ−1(2)b2 > · · · > κµ−1(N+1)bN+1 (Allocation Rule)
2. αipµ−1(i)i ≤ Vµ−1(i)i for all i (Individual Rationality)
3. Incentive compatibility:
Vµ−1(i)i − αipµ−1(i)i ≥ Vµ−1(i)j − αjpµ−1(i)j, for all (i, j)
where the counterfactual deviation prices are defined by: pµ−1(i)j =
κµ−1(j+1)
κµ−1(i)
bj+1
Sources at WebsiteX tell us that one key element in determining their score index κi
is the historical performance and click volume of the advertiser i, which is highly cor-
related with WebsiteX’s own quality rating system (see section 4). Therefore, we per-
form the counterfactual analysis under two alternative scoring systems (1) a coarser
one with κi ∈ {1, 2, 3} ≡ {low, medium, high quality}; and (2) a finer one with κi ∈
{3, 4, . . . , 15}.27
We simulate the per-click prices p˜t under the new mechanism. We also compute
the corresponding componentwise upper bound p¯t, and the componentwise lower bound
p
t
. Due to the computational burden of computing SNE of WGSPA, we only consider
auctions with no more than 7 positions. Complete implementation details are given in
the appendix. The summary statistics of the simulated (cross-sectional) per-click price
distribution under different model specifications are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.
Results. For simplicity, we focus on the results for the coarser scoring rule, in Table
6, in our discussion. First, bid scoring appears to “steepen” the price gradient across
positions, with the top position increasing in price but lower positions decreasing in
price. Specifically, in the Model I-Uniform results, the price per click for the top position
increases, on average, by 12 RMB (around 2 USD) relative to the baseline unscored
26See Varian (2007) for more details.
27As we do not have the data for the losers, we assume κN+1 to be the lowest score.
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scenario, while price for the second position decreases by 3 RMB (around $0.50). Results
are similar for Model II: there, the price for the top position increases by 6 RMB (around
$1) and the price for the second position also increases (by 2 RMB = $0.30), but the
prices for all lower positions decrease relative to the baseline scenario.
The price increases for the top positions are striking, especially as the bid-scoring rules
were intended to reward popular merchants (those with high scores) with price discounts.
To assess the extent of price discounting under the bid-scoring system, in Table 6 we also
provide summary statistics for the “bid-discount ratios”
κj+1
κj
for position j, which are
a measure of the price discount (cf. Eq. (13)). When this ratio is less than one, then
the bidder winning position j was given a price discount, while if it exceeds one, then
the bidder paid a price premium. We see that, across all four specifications, and across
the top four positions, this ratio was less than one in over 80% of the simulations. This
implies that the prices changed in response to bid scoring despite the winning bidders
being given price discounts. Apparently the price increases for the top positions were
triggered by more aggressive bidding in response to the introduction of bid scoring.
In Table 6, we also provide summary statistics for the bid-discount ratios
κj+1
κj
for the
baseline unscored scenario. There, we see that these statistics are not much different
from those generated in the bid scoring scenarios. This implies that bid-scoring does
not increase the degree of assortative matching in the allocation positions – it does not
appear that larger, more popular merchants were systematically more likely to end up in
top positions after the move to bid scoring. Thus while the fears of the small merchants
quoted in this paper’s introduction – that they have to pay much higher prices to get
their ads in top positions – seem justified to some extent by our simulation results, at
the same time popular merchants are not more likely (relative to the baseline scenario)
to get these top positions.
Finally, the right-hand side of Table 6 shows that total platform revenue from the
auctions remains unchanged from bid scoring. At the least, the finding that revenue does
not decrease upon the introduction of bid scoring may justify WebsiteX’s move toward
WGSPA: it can promote long term benefits beyond the scope of our analysis (such as
improvements in ad quality, and buyer responsiveness to ads) without sacrificing short
term revenue.
7 Conclusion
We conclude with a brief summary of some main points from our study. Empirically, we
uncover some horizontal differentiation between different types of keywords, as high qual-
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ity merchants have relatively higher valuations for informative keywords, and relatively
lower valuations for vague keywords. This suggests that high quality bidders, who are
typically also more experienced merchants, gravitate towards more narrowly defined key-
word queries which are likely to be made by serious buyers, and leave the top positions in
broader keyword queries for less experienced (lower quality) merchants. Counterfactual
evaluations show that the price trend becomes steeper under the score weighted gener-
alized second price auction, with much higher prices obtained for the top position but
lower prices for the other positions. Apparently, while scoring the auction grants price
discounts to popular merchants, our findings suggest that scoring also heightens the bid
competition, thus leading to higher prices for top positions. Overall, we do not find large
effects on platform revenue and sorting patterns from shifting to a scoring rule.
Our methodological approach is also novel as it is motivated by the equivalence be-
tween symmetric Nash equilibria in GSPA, and stable outcomes in the classic assign-
ment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). To accommodate some stylized empirical
facts in sponsored search auctions, our specification generalizes previous work by allow-
ing bidders to have preferences for positions which are not multiplicative in bidder- and
position-specific effects, and click volumes to be nondecreasing with position ranks. For
estimation, we utilize a Bayesian procedure and develop a Metropolis-Hastings within
Gibbs sampler.
Inevitably, some strong assumptions underlie our analytical framework in this paper.
It is possible, albeit at the cost of computational expense, to extend our Bayesian esti-
mation procedure to a more general setup, in order to accommodate asymmetric Nash
equilibria (as studied in Bo¨rgers et al (2013)), or bidder-specific click volumes (as in
Jeziorski and Moorthy (2014)). We leave these for future inquiry.
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Figure 1: Boxplot of Log Click Volume
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*The pair of numbers on the horizontal axis represents the values of two variables. For example,
Interaction(Rank,Specific)= 3.1 on the x-axis of the top-left graph means “3rd position, Specific dummy
= 1”
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Figure 2: Boxplot of Per-Click Price
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Table 2: Contingency Table of Bidders’ Quality versus Position Ranks
All Keywords
Position 1 2 3 4 5
High 7.2∗ 4.9 3.7 3.8 2.6
Medium 12.6 14.6 15.6 14.9 16.1
Low 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.3
Keywords with Specific= 1
Position 1 2 3 4 5
High 7.1 4.7 3.7 4.1 2.9
Medium 12.7 14.7 15.8 15.0 16.2
Low 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.9
Keywords with Brand= 1
Position 1 2 3 4 5
High 7.5 4.6 3.7 3.7 2.2
Medium 12.3 14.7 15.5 15.0 16.6
Low 0.2 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.2
Keywords with Promotional= 1
Position 1 2 3 4 5
High 6.6 3.4 3.2 2.7 2.0
Medium 13.2 16.1 16.6 15.9 17.0
Low 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.4 0.9
*All numbers in the table are given as percentage of all bidders.
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Table 3: MCMC Estimation: Model I
Dummy Regressor Posterior Model I Model I
Uniform Eq. Sel. Beta Eq. Sel.
constant mean -151.57 -214.89
s.d. (5.92) (8.00)
specific mean -63.42 -21.96
s.d. (6.82) (7.25)
promotional mean -14.58 -35.65
s.d. (10.10) (12.69)
brand mean 39.65 40.89
s.d. (6.27) (9.98)
high mean 688.96 704.04
s.d. (19.41) (26.86)
medium mean 479.75 563.92
s.d. (12.75) (16.26)
high×specific mean 539.45 382.34
s.d. (21.65) (21.84)
medium×specific mean 516.41 422.27
s.d. (16.60) (15.21)
high×promotional mean -42.53 -139.99
s.d. (23.43) (38.72)
medium×promotional mean -161.82 -86.42
s.d. (20.68) (26.22)
high×brand mean -341.05 -307.86
s.d. (18.08) (25.68)
medium×brand mean -395.04 -405.03
s.d. (14.67) (18.03)
σ2 mode 40484 49429
mean 40385 49513
s.d. (793) (366)
left parameter of beta distr. a mean N/A 3.27
s.d. N/A (0.59)
right parameter of beta distr. b mean N/A 0.83
s.d. N/A (0.09)
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Table 4: MCMC Estimation: Model II-Uniform Equilibrium Selection
Rank of Positions
Dummy Interaction Terms Posterior 1 2 3 4 5
high mean 95.83 -27.87 -360.55 -431.62 -463.62
s.d. (15.34) (26.93) (16.00) (22.21) (24.45)
medium mean -175.62 -140.20 -281.94 -424.62 -359.59
s.d. (26.16) (23.98) (19.24) (31.72) (25.66)
high×specific mean 16.39 230.99 -125.74 -157.83 -294.49
s.d. (34.01) (28.67) (38.07) (44.10) (52.92)
medium×specific mean -15.96 124.32 -190.90 -236.87 -332.36
s.d. (24.92) (24.99) (28.15) (13.95) (23.43)
high×promotional mean -356.05 -336.30 -153.56 -241.04 -78.22
s.d. (22.89) (26.42) (25.57) (33.76) (21.71)
medium×promotional mean -288.32 -324.80 -264.19 -305.36 -313.11
s.d. (21.04) (14.11) (18.97) (31.80) (21.93)
high×brand mean -109.84 -454.61 -47.33 -5.62 -16.25
s.d. (18.72) (27.74) (30.65) (27.37) (37.19)
medium×brand mean -114.13 -385.46 -50.34 96.47 67.63
s.d. (35.35) (22.66) (19.39) (26.89) (23.22)
Non-Interaction Terms Constant Specific Promotional Brand
mean 366.29 306.39 208.95 -70.1
s.d. (20.82) (21.94) (14.89) (19.79)
σ2 mode 36579
mean 36849
s.d. (330)
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Table 5: MCMC Estimation: Model II-Beta Equilibrium Selection
Rank of Positions
Dummy Interaction Terms Posterior 1 2 3 4 5
high mean 19.82 -102.09 -400.17 -483.75 -522.48
s.d. (19.67) (28.49) (17.07) (25.14) (24.15)
medium mean -229.56 -186.11 -338.50 -479.67 -416.46
s.d. (15.04) (15.60) (20.58) (14.98) (20.22)
high×specific mean -217.75 -15.15 -361.31 -401.81 -490.52
s.d. (24.10) (54.45) (52.33) (31.95) (25.76)
medium×specific mean -247.19 -125.35 -426.39 -471.28 -565.03
s.d. (44.74) (35.69) (50.40) (40.62) (29.00)
high×promotional mean -334.95 -363.30 -179.40 -174.20 -124.02
s.d. (34.52) (40.65) (30.01) (26.91) (57.01)
medium×promotional mean -323.63 -351.31 -304.38 -320.22 -345.52
s.d. (31.75) (31.43) (27.12) (27.11) (19.50)
high×brand mean -189.93 -495.68 -134.79 -71.69 -101.03
s.d. (20.33) (20.66) (16.70) (24.47) (23.43)
medium×brand mean -202.43 -459.60 -117.65 19.30 -3.05
s.d. (17.07) (17.93) (26.27) (24.02) (22.43)
Non-Interaction Terms Constant Specific Promotional Brand
mean 397.12 549.03 240.05 10.14
s.d. (13) (34.03) (26.28) (17.96)
σ2 mode 32767
mean 32911
s.d. (668)
left parameter of beta distr. a mean 2.62
s.d. (0.43)
right parameter of beta distr. b mean 0.73
s.d. (0.06)
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Appendix A Complete details of estimation
procedure
A.1 Specifying the Priors
We assume the prior distribution of β follows normal distribution N (β0, B0) and σ2
follows inverted Gamma distribution IG(α0/2, δ0/2). β and σ2 are independent and their
joint distribution will be denoted by pi(θ). We further assume that Vij = δ(Xi, Z
j; β)+ij
with ij follows i.i.d. N (0, σ2)28 across the index (i, j) and different auction t. Although
there always exists a stable matching for an arbitrary draw of Vij, it is not the case
once the GSP restriction p1 > p2 > · · · > pN being imposed. The intersection of
p1 > p2 > · · · > pN and the set of stable matchings of Shapley and Shubik may be
empty. When estimating the model we shall restrict our attention to the set of Vt that
can guarantee the existence of an equilibrium29:
{Vt ∈ GSP} ≡ {∃(t1, . . . , tN)|(t1, . . . , tN) solves (DP) & p1 > p2 > . . . pN ; ti = αipi}.
The probability of this region is Pr{Vt ∈ GSP} = c(θ; Xt,Zt) and can be approximated
by simulation.30 This specification, together with the restriction of the existence of
equilibrium, implies that the joint distribution of Vt is a multivariate truncated normal
distribution
f(Vt|θ; Xt,Zt) = 1(Vt ∈ GSP)
ΠNi=1Π
N
j=1
1
σ
φ
(
Vijt−δ(Xit,Zjt;β)
σ
)
c(θ; Xt,Zt)
,
where φ(·) is the pdf of standard normal distribution. The specification of p0(θ,V|X,Z) is
now completed after specifying pi(θ) and f(V|θ; X,Z) since p0(θ,V|X,Z) = f(V|θ; X,Z)pi(θ).31
Finally, for the Beta equilibrium selection model, we assume uniform priors over the shape
paraeters (a, b): pi(a, b) ∝ 1
c
2
, 0 < c <∞.
A.2 Algorithm
We propose a Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs sampler to draw (θ, λ,V) from the poste-
rior. Gibb’s sampling loops over the three conditional distributions f1(V|θ, λ, µ,p,X,Z, α) =
28While we use normality assumption in the empirical study, the proposed algorithm here can be easily
applied to other distributions.
29Here the indices 1, . . . , N refer only to the positions, and not to specific bidders.
30See A.3 for the implementation detail.
31By the independence assumption f(V|θ;X,Z) = ΠTt=1f(Vt|θ;Xt,Zt)
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ΠTt=1f1(Vt|θ, λ, µt,pt,Xt,Zt, αt), f2(θ|V, λ, µ,p,X,Z, α), and f3(λ|θ,V, µ,p,X,Z, α). As
it is difficult to draw directly from the above conditional densities, one can instead using
Metropolis-Hastings sampler. For f1, we simulate Vt for each t from normal distribution,
truncated to A(αt)pt ≤ b(Vt). This step amounts to impose equilibrium restriction, but
without explicitly adjusting for the effect of multiple equilibria. We then use an inde-
pendent M-H step to correct for it later, essentially weighted by the equilibrium selection
probability. For f2, it is a truncated normal likelihood function and hence can be simu-
lated using standard M-H procedure too. Below is the implementation detail:
1. Conditional on (θ(τ), λ(τ),V(τ)), update V(τ+1) via independence M-H chain
1.1 Simulate
V˜t ∼ qt(V˜t|V(τ+1)1 , . . . ,V(τ+1)t−1 ,V(τ)t ,V(τ)t+1, . . . ,V(τ)T , θ(τ), λ(τ))
= qt(V˜t|θ(τ)) ∝ 1(A(αt)pt ≤ b(V˜t))f(V˜t|θ(τ); Xt,Zt).
Following Logan, et al. (2008) we suggest the following steps to simulate V˜ijt
32: 1.
simulate the diagonal elements V˜iit from normal distribution with mean δ(Xit, Z
it; β(τ))
and variance σ2(τ), left-truncated at αitpit (individual rationality). 2. Given the
simulated V˜iit, one then proceed to simulate the off-diagonal elements V˜ijt, i 6=
j. The NBP condition implies that V˜ijt follows normal distribution with mean
δ(Xit, Z
jt; β(τ)) and variance σ2(τ), right-truncated at V˜iit − (αitpit − αjtpjt). 3. No-
tice that the monotonicity condition of per-click price does not directly affect the
simulation of Vij. Because the observed data already satisfies the monotonicity
condition, the simulated Vij will automatically lead to an equilibrium polytope of
per-click prices that intersects with the set p1 > p2 > . . . , pN .
1.2 Take
V
(τ+1)
t =
{
V
(τ)
t with probability 1− ρ,
V˜t with probability ρ,
32The standard GHK simulator does not apply in this case.
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where
ρ = 1 ∧ [ f1(V˜t|θ(τ), λ(τ), µt,pt,Xt,Zt, αt)
f1(V
(τ)
t |θ(τ), λ(τ), µt,pt,Xt,Zt, αt)
][qt(V(τ)t |θ(τ))
qt(V˜t|θ(τ))
]
= 1 ∧ [ L1(pt|V˜t, θ(τ), λ(τ), µt,Xt,Zt, αt)f(V˜t|θ(τ),Xt,Zt)
L1(pt|V(τ)t , θ(τ), λ(τ), µt,Xt,Zt, αt)f(V(τ)t |θ(τ),Xt,Zt)
][qt(V(τ)t |θ(τ))
qt(V˜t|θ(τ))
]
= 1 ∧ [ L1(pt|P(V˜t, αt), λ(τ), µt)f(V˜t|θ(τ),Xt,Zt)
L1(pt|P(V(τ)t , αt), λ(τ), µt)f(V(τ)t |θ(τ),Xt,Zt)
][1(A(αt)pt ≤ b(V(τ)t ))f(V(τ)t |θ(τ); Xt,Zt)
1(A(αt)pt ≤ b(V˜t))f(V˜t|θ(τ); Xt,Zt)
]
= 1 ∧ L1(pt|P(V˜t, αt), λ
(τ), µt)
L1(pt|P(V(τ)t , αt), λ(τ), µt)
.
In particular, if the equilibrium selection rule is uniform then ρ = 1∧vol(P(V
(τ)
t , αt))
vol(P(V˜t, αt))
.
In this case, V˜t will be accepted with probability 1 if the resulting polyhedron has
smaller volume relative to V
(τ)
t . To sum up, one would need to independently sim-
ulate T valuation matrices for T keyword auctions, and then run T independent
M-H steps to decide whether to accept the new draws or not.
2. Conditional on (θ(τ), λ(τ),V(τ+1)), update θ(τ+1) via random walk M-H chain
2.1 Simulate
θ˜ ∼ q(θ˜|θ(τ)) =
 A
−1 for θ˜ ∈ θ(τ) ± a
0 otherwise,
where a is a vector of the same dimension as θ and A is the volume of the box
spanned by θ
(τ)
i ± ai. As q(·|·) is a random-walk proposal density, it is also sym-
metric: q(θ˜|θ(τ)) = q(θ(τ)|θ˜).
2.2 Take
θ(τ+1) =
{
θ(τ) with probability 1− ρ,
θ˜ with probability ρ,
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where
ρ = 1 ∧ f2(θ˜|V
(τ+1), λ(τ), µ,p,X,Z, α)
f2(θ(τ)|V(τ+1), λ(τ), µ,p,X,Z, α)
= 1 ∧ Π
T
t=1f1(V
(τ+1)
t |θ˜, λ(τ), µt,pt,Xt,Zt, αt)pi(θ˜)
ΠTt=1f1(V
(τ+1)
t |θ(τ), λ(τ), µt,pt,Xt,Zt, αt)pi(θ(τ))
= 1 ∧ Π
T
t=1L1(pt|V(τ+1)t , θ˜, λ(τ), µt,Xt,Zt, αt)f(V(τ+1)t |θ˜,Xt,Zt)
ΠTt=1L1(pt|V(τ+1)t , θ(τ), λ(τ), µt,Xt,Zt, αt)f(V(τ+1)t |θ(τ),Xt,Zt)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ(τ))
Because L1 only depends on (Vt, αt, λ) and by construction V(τ+1)t ∈ GSP, the
above equation can be further simplified:
= 1 ∧
ΠTt=1
[
ΠNi=1Π
N
j=1
1
σ˜
φ
(
V
(τ+1)
ijt −δ(Xit,Zjt;β˜)
σ˜
)]
ΠTt=1
[
ΠNi=1Π
N
j=1
1
σ(τ)
φ
(
V
(τ+1)
ijt −δ(Xit,Zjt;β(τ))
σ(τ)
)]ΠTt=1c(θ(τ); Xt,Zt)
ΠTt=1c(θ˜; Xt,Zt)
pi(θ˜)
pi(θ(τ))
This step is nothing but treating V(τ+1) as the data, and then evaluate the likelihood
ratio of the truncated normal density.
3. Conditional on (θ(τ+1), λ(τ),V(τ+1)), update λ(τ+1) via random walk M-H chain
3.1 Simulate
λ˜ ∼ q(λ˜|λ(τ)) =
 A
−1 for λ˜ ∈ λ(τ) ± a
0 otherwise,
where a is a vector of the same dimension as λ and A is the volume of the box
spanned by λ
(τ)
i ± ai.
3.2 Take
λ(τ+1) =
{
λ(τ) with probability 1− ρ,
λ˜ with probability ρ,
where
ρ = 1 ∧ f3(λ˜|θ
τ+1,Vτ+1, µ,p,X,Z, α)
f3(λτ |θτ+1,Vτ+1, µ,p,X,Z, α)
= 1 ∧ Π
T
t=1L1(pt|P(Vτ+1t , αt), λ˜, µt)
ΠTt=1L1(pt|P(Vτ+1t , αt), λτ , µt)
.
Under uniform equilibrium selection, there is no need to perform step 3.
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A.3 Other Implementation Details
A.3.1 Characterizing the set of equilibrium prices
As discussed in section 3.1 above, the set of equilibrium per-click prices is a convex
polyhedron defined by various linear inequalities. First, we consider the no-blocking pair
conditions in Eq. (1). one can substitute ui + ti = Vii∀i into the rest of NBP conditions
conditions: The resulting system of inequalities are
Vii − Vij ≥ ti − tj ≥ Vji − Vjj. (8)
Equivalently, equation (8) can be re-written using the matrix notation
{p|A1p ≤ b1}.
Take a 3-by-3 case as an example,
A1 =

α1 −α2 0
−α1 α2 0
α1 0 −α3
−α1 0 α3
0 α2 −α3
0 −α2 α3

, and b1 =

V11 − V12
V22 − V21
V11 − V13
V33 − V31
V22 − V23
V33 − V32

. (9)
The second set of inequalities are the individual rationality conditions; i.e., bidders’
payoff should be positive
{p|A2p ≤ b2},
where A2 is the diagonal matrix with (α1, α2, . . . , αN) on the main diagonal and b2 =
(V11, V22, . . . , VNN)
′
. Finally, the last set of inequalities states that p1 > p2 > · · · >
pN ≤ 0, corresponding to the non-negative price systems that are consistent with the
generalized second price auction.
{p|A4p ≤ b4},
For a 3-by-3 case,
A3 =
[
−1 1 0
0 −1 1
]
, and b3 =
[
0
0
]
. (10)
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along with the nonegativity constraints
{p|A4p ≤ b4},
where A4 = −IN×N and b4 = −01N×1.
vThe set of equilibrium prices is given by P(V, α) = {p|A(α)p ≤ b(V)}, where
A = (A
′
1|A′2|A′3|A′4)′ and b = (b′1|b′2|b′3|b′4)′ .
A.3.2 Parameter Setup
For the first specification of bidder valuations (Model I), the prior for β is assume to
be joint normal distribution. The mean vector β0 equals to the zero vector, and the
covariance matrix B0 equals to 100000I, where I is an 12-by-12 identify matrix. The prior
for σ2 is assumed to be inverted Gamma distribution with shape parameter α0 = 2 and
scale parameter δ0 = 5. We choose the uniform distribution on the half-line as the prior
for the shape parameters (γ1, γ2) of the beta distribution when estimating the equilibrium
selection density. This set of prior values only impose minimum prior information on
the parameters. For example, when the shape parameter is 2, the variance of inverted
Gamma distribution does not exist. Moreover, given the “large sample” feature in the
Bayesian updating step for (β, σ),33the prior specification only plays a negligible role in
determining the posterior. We make 30,000 draws and the first 10,000 draws are treated
as the burn-in. We then keep every 50th draw of the remaining 20,000 draws to estimate
the posterior mean and standard deviations. The radius for the random walk proposal
for β, σ2, and (γ1, γ2) are respectively 100, 1000 and 0.2.
For Model II, the prior for β is assume to be joint normal distribution. The mean
vector β0 equals to the zero vector, and the covariance matrix B0 equals to 100000I,
where I is an 44-by-44 identify matrix. We make 50,000 draws and the first 30,000 draws
are treated as the burn-in. We then keep every 50th draw of the remaining 20,000 draws
to estimate the posterior mean and standard deviations. The radius for the random walk
proposal for β, σ2, and (γ1, γ2) are respectively 5, 100 and 0.2.
A.3.3 Calculating the Volume of Equilibrium Polytope of Prices
In order to evaluate the likelihood, one has to compute the volume of P(V, α) if uniform
selection is imposed. We do it via simulation: first, we draw 1000 independent (multi-
variate) uniform random numbers from the smallest bounding box of P(V, α). Second,
33In a 5-player-5-position game, 25 Vij will be drawn in MCMC. If there are 100 keyword auctions,
(β, σ2) will be estimated by 2500 simulated Vij .
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the volume of P(V, α) is approximately the volume of the bounding box times the pro-
portion of the previous draws that belong to P(V, α). If beta selection is imposed, one
instead draw beta random numbers from the bounding box. We also try 5000 draws and
the accuracy seems to be similar.
A.3.4 Calculating the Truncation Probability c(θ; Xt,Zt)
We use a simulation-extrapolation strategy to compute the truncation probability, as
we find that c(θ; Xt,Zt) is a relatively smooth function of θ. Given θ, and for each
keyword auction t we can simulate N valuation matrices Vi to approximate c(θ; Xt,Zt)
by 1
N
∑N
i=1 1(Vi ∈ GSP). This step would require solving (DP). We first make 10,000
MCMC draws by ignoring this truncation probability. The first 1000 draws are discarded,
and we keep every 10th draw of the remaining chain. We simulate c(θj; Xt,Zt) under
these simulated θj, j = 1, 2, . . . , 900. Finally, we regress c(θj; Xt,Zt) on θj using beta
regression34, with the logistic function being the link function. The estimated regression
coefficients are then used to calculate c(θ; Xt,Zt) in MCMC. One important fact is that if
Vi 6∈ GSP, then a+ bVi 6∈ GSP, where (a, b) are some scalar constants. It is the relative
size of each component within V that leads to nonexistence of equilibrium, not because of
its scale. As a result, the scale parameter and the non-interacted location parameters (see
Appendix B) does not affect c(θ; Xt,Zt). When running the regression, we discard the
non-interacted location parameters, and normalized the interacted location parameters
by the scale parameter σ.
Appendix B Identification
The specification of the latent valuation Vij implicitly assumes that the distribution of Vij
belongs to the location-scale family. However, the meaning of location and scale should
be carefully interpreted in matching models, as location parameter for Vij may actually
possess scale effect on the dependent variable p.
There are three types of parameters in the specification of Vij: interacted location
parameter (β4, . . . , β11), non-interacted location parameter (β0, . . . , β3) and scale param-
eter σ. First, the interacted location parameters characterize the preference over position
ranks. Or equivalently, they characterize the complementarity between quality and ranks,
and hence will determine the (cross-sectional) distribution of allocation. They are also
related to the price distribution through the channel of the no-blocking-pair conditions,
34Beta regression is a flexible regression model to handel the cases when the dependent variable is
proportion.
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because they essentially determine the shape of the equilibrium polytope of price. The
point identification results for the interacted location parameters (up to scale normaliza-
tion) from the allocation data µ have been established in Choo-Siow model and Fox (2010)
under different model assumptions.
The price data essentially provides identification power for parameters with scale
effect on the valuation matrix. There are two types of such parameters: First, the
non-interacted location parameters cannot be identified through the no-blocking-pair
conditions, as they are differenced out. Instead, the individual rationality condition can
be used to learn information about them. Such parameters do not affect the preference
over ranks, and consequently they have no effect on the allocation. However, as they
would shift the scale of the valuation matrix, they will also shift the size of the equilibrium
polytope of prices. Similarly, the scale parameter σ have no effect on the allocation, but
it will also affect the size of the equilibrium polytope of price. Both non-interacted
location and scale parameters have scale effect on the price distribution. The difference
is, the non-interacted location parameters only shift the size of the equilibrium polytope
in certain directions (through individual rationality), while the scale parameter shift the
size of the equilibrium polytope in all directions. By looking at the price distribution,
and the shape/size of the support of prices one can then learn information about these
parameters. The intuition is simple: if on average the price is $5, the scale of V cannot
be around $1, as it would violate the individual rationality. On the other hand, it cannot
be around $100, as $5 would be too cheap under competitive bidding.
Remark: a partial identification approach. It is possible to derive a bound
for the structural parameters in terms of bounds of CDF (similarly to Haile and Tamer,
2003).
Theorem 1. Suppose the econometrician observes T independent auctions indexed by
t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Let F (p|X,Z, α) represents the conditional distribution of observed per-
click prices. We denote by B(X,Z, α, ij; θ), the smallest (random) bounding box that
covers P(V, α) = P(X,Z, α, ij; θ). B(X,Z, α, ij; θ) = Π
N
i=1[pil, piu], where (pil, piu) are
respectively the smallest and largest elements of the i-th coordinate of P. Define two
random vectors
p¯ = max B(X,Z, α, ij; θ) = (p1u, p2u, . . . , pNu) and p = min B(X,Z, α, ij; θ) = (p1l, p2l, . . . , pNl).
The identified set of θ is given by
Θ0 =
{
θ|F (p|X,Z, α; θ) ≥ F (p|X,Z, α) ≥ F (p¯|X,Z, α; θ)},
Proof. Conditional on (X,Z), the (joint) distribution function of p, F (p|X,Z), is
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identified by the sampling process. Given (X,Z, α, ij; θ), p is a measurable selection
from the set of stable prices P. By construction, p ≤ p ≤ p¯, for almost-all ij, where the
inequality are defined componentwise. This implies that the distributions of p, p, and p¯
are ordered in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, which immediately implies
the bound on CDF.
Although the bound approach is appealing as it does not require an equilibrium selection
assumption, it is extremely computationally demanding to compute such bound since
for each draw of latent valuation matrix, one has to solve (DP).35 By contrast, as we
discussed earlier, the Bayesian approach does not require solving for game for each draw
of the latent valuations, and hence is computatinoally more appealing. See also Uetake
and Watanabe (2012) for a bounds approach for estimating a two-sided matching model
applied to bank mergers.
Appendix C Complete details of counterfactual
simulation
To solve for the set of SNE in the WGSPA, we consider each possible allocation in turn;
for each candidate allocation, we use the inequalities characterizing WGSPA to determine
the set of equilibrium bids (which may be empty if this candidate allocation is not an
equilibrium), and then repeat this routine for all possible allocations. Consequently, the
problem of solving SNE of WGSPA is combinatorial. Parallel to the standard GSPA,
the above inequalities can be written as matrix form. The set of equilibrium bid under
allocation µ will be referred as Bµ ≡ {b|Dµ(α, κ)b ≤ cµ(V)}.
We then simulate the structural parameters θ from the posterior distribution (by
directly using the MCMC output), and for each θ we draw the utility shocks ijt to
obtain the valuation matrix Vt. Given Vt one can solve the game to obtain equilibrium
per-click prices. As the number of SNE may be huge, we do not attempt to solve all
SNE. Instead, we employ a simple routine to perform the counterfactual analysis. As
long as an equilibrium allocation is found, we then stop searching for another equilibrium
allocation36 and simulate bi from the equilibrium polyhedron of bids Bµ
37 according to
35Using the approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2007), the total number of times which the game must
be solvedgame solving is at least equal to the numberθ times the number of keyword auctions (= 487)
times the number of V draws. Moreover, depending on c(θ;Xt,Zt), one has to discard many V draws
that do not satisfy the GSPA restriction.
36To avoid the concentration on a particular type of allocation, we perform random search.
37There is no need to simulate the maximum bid b1 for the following two reasons: First, the per-click
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uniform distribution or the estimated beta distribution. Finally, we apply the scored
pricing rule in Eq. (13) to obtain the per-click price p˜t.
prices are irrelevant of b1. Second, if (b2, . . . , bN+1) satisfy all the inequalities, one can always choose b1
large enough to meet the allocation rule.
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